"Crisis rhetoric in an of itself is simply a frantic pointing. What we should be cautious about are the suggestions that follow (If the war on terror has taught me anything...) Discerning how the rhetor, Nicholson Baker in this instance, wants to solve the crisis should be part of its validity estimation. For instance, if Nicholson Baker suggested that we start using card catalogs exclusively and remove any computer from the library that isn't devoted to climate control--then I would suggest that his crisis has a much heavier burden of proof. Being that his solutions are much more modest--in places amounting to little more than "slow down the frantic microfilming already"--his crisis needs less verification than those promoting destruction through preservation. In other words, because many of the crises he is acting as whistle-blower on are followed by much more extreme and irreversible solutions."

I like Taylor’s point on the almost necessary crisis-condition during the course of philosophical thought production. Indeed, the philosophical realm has experienced continuous crises, beginning from classical antiquity: Was not there an intellectual crisis that framed the debate between the sophists and the advocates of truth as an end in itself? Was not there a philosophy in crisis that cloaked Socrates’ trial and conviction?

One, however, does not have to travel so much in time to trace similar cultural patterns. Was not there a comparable crisis (politically charged this time) between “internal” and “external” historians that paved the way to Kuhn’s revolution and the birth of STS? Similarly, one should not think that “crises” are a solely Occidental “privilege”. For it was a cultural (both material and intellectual) crisis that had hit China during the 6th and 5th centuries B.C. which provided Lao Tzu’s with the sociological background to base upon his influential philosophical thought.

As for the question of which crisis is the most “pressing’ I am not sure if there an adequate, even legitimate answer. For this is a question that can only be answered a posteriori.

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This question asks the reader to be somewhat skeptical of Baker’s claims, but it does not presuppose a right or wrong answer. Brian asks the reader to engage in an evaluative assessment of Baker’s claims: if we are not permitted by Baker to take others’ “numbers” at face value, why should we take his? This is complicated by Brian’s allusion to Baker’s professed inability to follow Hayes’ work; this complication seems to be a rhetorical strategy on Brian’s part to further the reader’s skepticism.
The question itself is relatively simple (i.e. “what’s your opinion”) but as it is prefaced with the references to the text, Brian is selectively directing our attention to the more problematic instances of Baker’s own attempts. I don’t get a sense that Brian is necessarily cynical, but rather is asking for something that I and others in the class have asked out of Baker: a bit more clarity and actual comparison of these figures rather than a mere dismissal of those that do not fit into Baker’s own assessment.
That said, the question does not explicitly ask us to seek out information elsewhere, but I think an argument can be made that Brian implies that we could hold Baker’s treatment against the outside sources which Baker only alludes to. That said, the question assumes the ability to intelligibly juxtapose these figures (and I agree). Because of the critical and self-contained nature of the question, the persona that Brian adopts here is one of a student: he does not presume to offer an alternative, but merely asks the reader to form an opinion based on the present evidence.

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